Friday, September 12, 2008

William Stoczkowksi, "Explaining Human Origins"

Stoczkowski begins by noting "what every schoolchild knows" -- elements of human origin stories repeatedly found in French and Russian textbooks. The prehistoric environment was cold and harsh, "teeming with savage animals." People led a difficult existence, constantly suffering and afraid. But then they learned to use tools, to control fire, to live in groups, and to build shelters. This allowed them to triumph over the hostile environment despite their physical weaknesses. He further notes that Enlightenment philosophers had essentially the same view of human origins. The origin stories are characterized by some crucial assumptions:
  • Environmental determinism (harsh environment directly stimulates learning and development)
  • Materialism (culture is determined by material conditions)
  • Utilitarianism (human activity is based on achieving practical ends)
  • Individualism (culture exists to benefit individuals)
A very different account of human origins was presented by Marshall Sahlins in 1968. He argued that the original humans lived in a state of well-being, very different from the "decadence" of contemporary civilization. They had plenty of food, were content with little, had plenty of leisure time, felt happy and unworried, and enjoyed freedom and equality. Sahlins' pessimism about the present and future was strikingly matched by his optimism about the past. His account works as a simple reversal of the more common story of human progress and triumph over nature.

Stoczkowski analyzes 24 "scenarios of hominisation" published between 1820 and 1986. Common themes include tools, bipedalism, free hands, langauge, social life, large brain, superior smarts, reduced canine teeth, cooperation, sexual division of labor, food-sharing, and hunting. This list has not changed significantly over the course of the sample; when features such as bipedalism, large brains, and social cooperation are considered carefully (birds and dinosaurs are bipedal; whales and elephants have large brains; many apes cooperate with each other, and even use and make tools), it becomes apparent that they are included not necessarily because they objectively distinguish humans from animals.

On the other hand, there are a number of possibilities for why there would be recurring themes in origins stories (beyond Stoczkowski's obvious pick, that powerful hidden "common-sense" assumptions have dominated a diverse range of Western anthropological thinking in the past couple of centuries):
  • Empirical evidence
  • Logic (nothing else is thinkable)
  • Theory (for example, natural selection theory imposes certain constraints)
  • Ideological concerns
In general, these are all rejected -- the scenarios are from a variety of ideological and theoretical schools, and constraints of evidence and logic are specifically checked for each. For example, nine of Stoczkowski's scenarios discuss sexual division of labor and food-sharing as arising from the advent of hunting. The authors of the scenarios generally stress that men would be better suited to hunting -- because men were predisposed to it, because women were hampered by child-rearing. But women are not always excluded from hunting; hunting does not always require great mobility; women are not necessarily immobilized by child-rearing duties; and women are sometimes included in hunting but barred from using the same tools as men, casting doubt on theories that emphasize economic efficiency. Furthermore, it is also quite logically possible to conceive of "sexual division of labor" as being essentially a taboo that prohibits women from certain activities (due to hunter-gatherer beliefs about animal and menstrual blood, for instance).

So it seems that modern anthropological theories of human origins enjoy credibility that is largely based on conformity to "common-sense" anthropology, rather than conformity to evidence or logical constraints. This illustrates "the weakness of our imagination" and that common-sense ideas can persist for centuries without significant change, creating links between different historical and cultural contexts.

Thursday, September 11, 2008

The Market System, by Charles Lindblom

Lindblom's book explores the "market system -- how it works and what to make of it."

To place the market system in context, he urges the reader to "think society, not economy." Human beings engage in massive amounts of social coordination to feed, clothe, and entertain themselves. To educate a child requires buildings, books, teachers, people who educated the teachers, raw materials to build the buildings, and so on -- a nearly unfathomable number of people. The market system is one method by which society achieves coordination -- others include the state, the family, the corporation (a command structure in a market milieu), and "civil society" (including political parties, lobbying organizations, museums, charities, and research laboratories).

For an object or service to potentially fall under the domain of the market system, it needs to (a) be controllable (i.e., respond to an on/off switch); (b) be scarce; and (c) be obtainable without compulsion. The market system relies on the principle of "quid pro quo" -- an individual can make claims based on voluntary transactions he makes with others.

But not everything that could fall in the domain of the market system actually does. There are a number of objections to the application of the market system, particularly that the process of the market is immoral, unethical, or simply inappropriate in some areas.

For example, consider the following ideas:

  • Blood should be donated, not sold
  • Family members should not engage in financial transactions with one another
  • Social solidarity is undercut by the very process of buying and selling
  • Buying insurance reveals a lack of faith in God's care [a bit non-mainstream]
  • Some people oppose shopping as a matter of principle
  • Some activities are only enjoyable if done for free
  • High culture needs to be subsidized by the government
  • Drugs and prostitution are often illegal
  • People should not be able to buy guns (or have private armies for that matter)
  • Education should be provided universally, without regard to ability to pay for it
  • People with nothing should still be taken care of, not frozen out
  • Government officials need to be isolated from the market -- corruption is bad
  • It may be cheaper to bypass the market (for example, to collect trash)
  • Entrepreneurs seek state protection and privileges
  • People doubt the competence and motives of individual choice, and want deliberating collective authority over some decisions (such as food regulation, environmental issues)
So the actual domain of the market system is somewhat less than its theoretical maximum reach, for a number of reasons -- which may be good or bad.

In the spirit of placing the market system in a larger context, it should be pointed out that quid pro quo is not the only basis on which a society can justify individual claims to resources. There can also be claims based on birth, ancestry, group membership, good conduct, prowess, and simple human status. Furthermore, the market system places a particular value on certain kinds of contributions, but it neglects to value non-market contributions (raising one's own children) and does not even necessarily value market contributions appropriately (no way to take into account dependencies on existing infrastructure; there are also spillover and monopoly issues).

I've neglected to mention the pro-market arugment in this summary, because that is best left to the discussion of the economics textbooks. In contrast to the pro-market argument, there are leftist concerns with inequality, the poor, and elite manipulation of the masses. (Lindblom mentions some other worries about the market -- namely, that work is degrading, that the market encourages people to view each other as means rather than ends, and that the market ethic corrupts moral values by glorifying greed and naked self-interest, but thinks these worries are misplaced.)

Lindblom also discusses whether the market system adds to or subtracts from human freedom (it's complicated), and whether the market system enhances or obstructs democracy (it's complicated). A key question is the extent to which elites are able to manipulate the masses (via advertising, in both the market and political contexts). [His suggested story seems to go as follows: democracy got its start with the rise of merchant/entrepreneurial elites who curbed the state's powers before launching an informational assault to obstruct fuller democracy.]

In the end, the take-away message is: Think society, not economy. Lindblom concludes: "What kind of society do you want?"